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Saving Missouri's Public Defender System:
A Call for Adequate Legislative Funding
I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitutions of both the United States and the state of Missouri
guarantee an indigent defendant the ri ht to effective legal counsel when the
defendant's freedom is in jeopardy. Due to a caseload crisis that is
compounded by many other factors, the Office of the Missouri Public
Defender cannot serve all the indigent clients who depend on it. The most
notable of the issues plaguing the public defender system is that of funding.
As a result of a severely underfunded system, public defenders are without
resources necessary to effectively represent all of their clients. In order to
improve client services and to overcome the system's current state of
instability, greater funding is needed from Missouri's state legislature. Thus
far, the legislature has failed to give such funding voluntarily, and unless such
funds are obtained, Missouri's public defender system will not be able to
provide constitutionally adequate legal assistance to all indigent Missouri
defendants. To achieve this greater level of funding, it may be necessary for
Missouri's judiciary to compel the legislature to provide funding, and it will
certainly be necessary for Missouri's legal community to support the system
in its efforts.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Development of the Indigent Client's Constitutional Right to
Counsel
In 1963, the United States Supreme Court decided the famous case of
Gideon v. Wainwright,2 and forever changed the dynamics of the criminal
1. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall ... have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. "No State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, §
1; see also MO. CONST. art. I, § 18(a) ("the accused shall have the right to appear and
defend, in person and by counsel").
2. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
1
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justice system. In this case, the Court held for the first time in our nation's
history that the Sixth3 and Fourteenth4 Amendments of the United States
Constitution guaranteed indigent defendants the right to counsel in state
felony prosecutions.5 Following Gideon, the United States Supreme Court
came down with several other cases that further expanded an indigent
6defendant's right to counsel during a first appeal, at every stage of
prosecutionin state juvenile delinquency proceedings,8 and in state
misdemeanor proceedings in which actual imprisonment 9 or a suspended jail
sentence l° is imposed. In response to these decisions, states developed three
primary models for providing indigent defense programs. First, some states
set up traditional "public defender" programs, in which attorneys are paid
salaries to provide representation to indigent clients on a full-time basis."
Second, other states require each court to assign indigent cases to private
attorneys who are then compensated on a case-by-case basis.12 Third, states
sometimes enter into contracts with private attorneys who agree to provide
representation in indigent cases. 
13
After states established their chosen indigent defense programs, issues
regarding attorney performance within those systems arose. While many of
3. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
4. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 341-45.
6. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 355-57 (1963).
7. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224-25 (1967).
8. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
9. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).
10. Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 662, 674 (2002).
11. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, GIDEON'S
BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA'S CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 2 (2004)
(citing Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the
United States, 58 LAW& CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 32 (1995)).
12. Id.
13. Id. Missouri has experience with a variance of each of the three primary
models of providing indigent defense. See infra Part II.B.
[Vol. 74
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the early post-Gideon cases focused on errors within the judicial system and
an indigent client's ability to retain counsel, the Court's decision in Strickland
v. Washington14 addressed attorney errors that impeded the client's right to
effective counsel.' 5 In Strickland, the Court held that relief was appropriate if
a client could prove that he was deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. 16 This could be accomplished by first showing that his counsel's
performance was below accepted community standards and was therefore
"objectively unreasonable,"' and second, that his counsel's deficient
performance negatively affected the outcome of the trial.' 8
Even today, the Strickland test remains the proper standard for
determining whether a defendant was denied his constitutional right to
effective assistance of counsel in most cases.' 9 However, the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Cronic2° made it possible in some cases for
the defendant to prove ineffective assistance of counsel by demonstrating that
his attorney "entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful
adversarial testing." Furthermore, although "[a]bsolute equality is not
required,, 22 an indigent defendant is entitled to legal representation that is
substantially equal to that received by defendants with privately paid
23attorneys. Thus, a high expectation is placed on states to deliver competent,
effective indigent defense programs. Missouri has put forth many efforts to
do just that, but with only limited success.
B. Missouri's Public Defender System
The Missouri Constitution, consistent with aforementioned principles,
guarantees "the right to appear and defend, in person and by counsel. 24
After the Gideon decision, indigent defendants in Missouri were represented
by court-appointed attorneys who were not paid for their legal assistance.
25
In 1967, legislation establishing a public defender system was proposed in the
26state's General Assembly but it did not pass. Similar proposals came before
14. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
15. Joe Margulies, Resource Deprivation and the Right to Counsel, 80 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 673, 687 (1989).
16. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
17. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
687-91).
18. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 691-94.
19. See Smith, 528 U.S. at 285; see also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698 (2002).
20. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
21. Id. at 659.
22. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963).
23. McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wis., 486 U.S. 429, 438 (1988); see also
Smith, 528 U.S. at 277 n.9.
24. Mo. CONST. art. I, § 18(a).
25. State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, 572-73 (Mo. 1971) (en banc).
26. Id. at 579 (Finch, C.J., dissenting).
2009]
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the General Assembly and failed at each legislative session until 1972.27
Saddled with the responsibility of representing indigent defendants without
compensation from the state, Missouri attorneys grew tired of this financial
burden and took the issue to the Missouri Supreme Court in 1971 in State v.
28Green. At the time, Missouri was one of only three states that did not have
an established program to compensate attorneys who represented indigent
clients. 29 The Green court held that it would no longer "compel the attorneys
of Missouri to discharge alone 'a duty which constitutionally is the burden of
the State,"' and left the funding problem as an issue for the state legislature.3 1
As a result, in 1972 Chapter 600 of the Missouri Revised Statutes3'
established a Public Defender Commission, thereby securing paid counsel for
indigent clients. 32 At the time of its inception, the Missouri program relied on
federal grants to employ public defenders and create court-appointed counsel
programs.33 Public defender offices were established in St. Louis and Kansas
City and private, court-appointed counsel were available throughout the rest
of the state.34 By 1977, public defender offices were in eighteen of
Missouri's judicial circuits and the remaining twenty-five judicial circuits
used the appointed counsel program.35
Several years later, in 1982, the Office of the Missouri State Public
Defender (MSPD) was established as an independent department within
Missouri's judicial branch, and court-appointed counsel were replaced with
contract counsel.36 In other words, as a result of the MSPD, private attorneys
contracted with the state to represent indigent clients in areas where there was
no public defender office.3F However, hiring contract counsel became
exceedingly expensive for the state and finding private attorneys willing to
work for the state's set fee became progressively more difficult.
38
Consequently, the system was again reorganized in 1989, and the contract
counsel practice was eliminated in favor of full-time public defenders in
27. Id.
28. Id. at 572 (majority opinion).
29. Id. at 579 n.3.
30. Id. at 573 (quoting State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441,446 (N.J. 1966)).
31. See MO. REV. STAT. §§ 600.011-.101 (2000 & Supp. 2008).
32. STATE OF Mo. Pun. DEFENDER COMM'N, FISCAL YEAR 2007 ANNUAL REPORT
6 (2007), available at http://www.publicdefender.mo.gov/about/FY2007AnnualRep
ort.pdf.
33. Id. "High Impact" grants for urban areas supplemented Federal Law
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offices throughout the state.39 This specialized structure of employing full-
time public defenders is how the program continues to operate today.
4 0
With the hope of improving efficiency, this current system aims to
promote specialized practice areas and has three legal services divisions to
meet that goal.41 First, the Trial Division represents indigent defendants
charged with misdemeanors or felonies at the trial level and is divided into
thirty-three district offices throughout the state.42 Additionally, a statewide
trial division office, the Civil Commitment Defense Unit, represents
defendants in "sexually violent predator commitment cases. ' '43 Second, the
Appellate/Post-Conviction Relief Division represents indigent defendants
who have been convicted of felonies and are seeking appeals.
44
Consequently, this division defends clients in direct appeals to state appellate
courts and the Supreme Court of Missouri. 45 It also represents clients in post-
conviction proceedings in state courts and writs of certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court.46 This division has offices in Kansas City, St. Louis,
and Columbia.47 Third, at both the trial and appellate levels, the Capital
Division represents indigent defendants facing the death penalty.48 This
division also has offices in Kansas City, St. Louis, and Columbia.49
39. Id.
40. Id.; see also Missouri State Public Defender, Legal Divisions,
http://www.publicdefender.mo.gov/legal/legal division.htm (last visited Mar. 23,
2009). However, the MSPD does still utilize a contract program with private
attorneys under some circumstances, and is hoping to expand its contract program to
relieve some of its public defenders from a small portion of their caseload. Missouri
State Public Defender, MSPD Contract Counsel Cases, http://www.publicdefender.
mo.gov/contracts/contractoverview.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2009).
41. STATE OF MO. PUB. DEFENDER COMM'N, supra note 32, at 6.
42. Id.; see also Missouri State Public Defender, Legal Divisions, supra note 40.
According to Deputy Director Cathy Kelly, there are now 33 district offices instead of
36 because two Youth Advocacy Units and one Conflicts Office were closed due to
MSPD's inability to support the caseloads. E-mail from Cathy Kelly, Deputy
Director, Office of the Missouri Public Defender, to author (Feb. 18, 2009) (on file
with author).
43. E-mail from Cathy Kelly to author, supra note 42.
44. STATE OF MO. PuB. DEFENDER COMM'N, supra note 32, at 6; see also
Missouri State Public Defender, Legal Divisions, supra note 40.
45. Missouri State Public Defender, Legal Divisions, supra note 40.
46. E-mail from Cathy Kelly to author, supra note 42. This includes some post-
conviction death-row proceedings at the trial level. Missouri State Public Defender,
Legal Divisions, supra note 40.
47. Missouri State Public Defender, Appellate / Post-Conviction Relief Division,
http://www.publicdefender.mo.gov/legal/appellatePCR.htm (last visited Mar. 23,
2009).
48. This includes state trial courts, the Supreme Court of Missouri, and the
United States Supreme Court. Missouri State Public Defender, Legal Divisions,
supra note 40.
49. STATE OF MO. PUB. DEFENDER COMM'N, supra note 32, at 6.
2009]
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The indigent defense system in Missouri started with two public
defender offices and a majority of court-appointed attorneys, transitioned into
more offices and some contract attorneys, and is now entirely reliant on full-
time public defenders located in offices state-wide. Though the system has
demonstrated progressive tendencies since its inception, more evolution is
needed to keep pace with the ever-changing needs of Missouri's indigent
population.
C. An Emerging Crisis
The American Bar Association (ABA) unveiled distressing findings
about the nation's indigent defense programs in its 2004 publication,
Gideon's Broken Promise. America's Continuing Quest for Equal Justice.5 °
In this report, the ABA concluded that, "due to chronic under-funding and a
lack of essential resources, coupled with crushing attorney workloads and
other factors, many indigent defense systems do not provide even
constitutionally adequate representation, much less the type of quality
representation recommended by national standards."" In some cases,
indigent clients only received counsel after spending months or years in jail,
52
while other poor individuals never receive counsel at all. Even for those
who eventually received counsel, indigent defendants were, and still are,
often faced with sub-standard representation due to a number of factors, such
as lack of continuity in client-attorney relationships and lack of investigative
resources.5 3 Further, the trend of sub-par representation of indigent clients
has increased the incidence of wrongful conviction,54 depriving up to 10,000
innocent people a year of their rights and freedom, and even taking the lives
of others. C
As to the cause of the disastrous condition of the nation's indigent
defense programs, the ABA cites a number of different factors. First, the
ABA report highlights the systemic problems caused by the gap in resources
allocated between prosecutors and public defenders. 56 Further, the problem is
also compounded by attorneys who are ineffective due to inexperience,
unmanageable caseloads, and other prominent factors.57 In addition, the
50. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, supra note
11.
51. Id. at 16.
52. Id. at 22-23.
53. See infra note 57.
54. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, supra note
11, at 4 (citing The Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org).
55. Id. at 3-4.
56. Id. at 13-14.
57. Id. at 16-20. Other factors, some of which arise out of a lack of resources
and heavy caseloads, include client meetings only hours before hearings, premature
encouragement for defendants to plead guilty, lack of continuity in client-attorney
[Vol. 74
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ABA states judges also encourage frightened and confused defendants to
waive their right to counsel in order to speed up their processing time and
58
receive leniency.
Unfortunately, Missouri's public defender system suffers from many of
these same problems discussed in the ABA report - problems that are
exacerbated by inadequate funding. The MSPD's 2007 annual report began
by stating, "Missouri's State Public Defender System continues to operate in
a crisis mode."59 The report cited attorneys' caseloads and a "tsunami of...
turnover" as pressing issues because they perpetuate a "vicious cycle" of
attorneys leaving due to high caseloads and being replaced with less
experienced attorneys who later resign because they also cannot handle the
heavy caseloads. 60  Highlighting the caseload crisis, Missouri's public
defenders serve as the attorney for 75-80% of criminal cases in most
jurisdictions throughout the state.61  In other words, the MSPD's
approximately 350 attorneys serve as counsel in almost 90,000 Missouri
62cases each year. Each trial division public defender has an average of 296
cases per year, which is well above the Department of Justice's National
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice (NAC) recommended 225 cases
63per year. Due to the heavy caseload, attorneys continue to succumb to the
pressure and leave the MSPD with an annual 20% turnover rate.
64
Another factor contributing to the public defender's retention rate is
financial in nature. A 2005 independent study of the state's public defender
system concluded that Missouri's public defender system was the lowest
funded statewide indigent defense system in the nation and that the whole
system was "on the verge of collapse." 65 Underfunding not only limits the
MSPD's ability to hire a larger number of attorneys, it also restricts the salary
relationships, lack of investigation, research and zealous advocacy, conflicts in
representation, and ethical violations. Id.
58. Id. at 23-25.
59. STATE OF MO. PUB. DEFENDER COMM'N, supra note 32, at 3.
60. Id. at 3-4.
61. Id. at 7.
62. Missouri State Public Defender, About MSPD - Agency Profile,
http://www.publicdefender.mo.gov/about/agencyprofile.htm (last visited Mar. 23,
2009).
63. STATE OF MO. PuB. DEFENDER COMM'N, supra note 32, at 8. NAC standards
actually "recommend no more than 150 felony cases or 400 misdemeanor[] [cases] or
200 juveniles cases or 25 appeals." E-mail from Cathy Kelly to author, supra note 42
(emphasis added). MSPD concluded that its blended caseload of misdemeanors and
felonies translates to a recommended caseload of 225 per the NAC standards. Id.
64. STATE OF MO. PUB. DEFENDER COMM'N, supra note 32, at 9.
65. Press Release, Mo. State Pub. Defender, Public Defender Commission
Adopts Rule to Limit Availability of Overloaded Offices to Take on More Cases
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of those it does employ. A salary with the MSPD starts at $37,296 per year,66
which is at least 14.5% below the average minimum salary for comparable
67positions. New attorneys are unable to work at substandard salaries while
simultaneously paying off tens of thousands of dollars in student loan debt
and supporting families. 68 Further, a full-time prosecuting attorney makes at
least $36,000 more per year than a full-time district public defender.
69
Additionally, public defenders average more than seven years of criminal law
experience and serve as counsel in most of Missouri's intricate criminal
cases, but are still paid less than the average new attorney in Missouri's
70 71private sector. Compounding the low salary is the fact that until last year, 1
public defenders were the only state employees forced to pay their own
parking expenses, costing each attorney an average of $80 per month.72 With
this bleak financial picture, it is difficult to attract or retain experienced,
zealous advocates as public defenders in Missouri.
While paying parking expenses may seem petty, it is indicative of a
much larger problem. While national standards dictate that states must fund
their indigent defense systems,73 Missouri requires its counties to provide and
fund public defender office space and utilities.74  A large issue arises,
therefore, when counties have to share public defender offices because
"[c]ounties simply have no interest in the adequacy of the Public Defender
facilities." 75 This disinterest arises in large part because the MSPD division
offices often cover more than one county, and many counties assert that they
should not have to pay for offices or parking physically located elsewhere.
Missouri's current funding system, therefore, necessitates that counties
cooperate with each other and with the MSPD 77 but this has not been the
case. It has so far instead resulted in hostility toward the MSPD and conflicts
between counties. 78 The self-paid parking dilemma was a result of the state'sdeclaration that it is each county's responsibility to pay for public defenders'
66. Missouri State Public Defender, Salaries, http://www.publicdefender.mo.
gov/employment/salaries.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2009).
67. STATE OF MO. PuB. DEFENDER COMM'N, supra note 32, at 9.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 72.
70. Id. at 68.
71. E-mail from Cathy Kelly to author, supra note 42.
72. STATE OF MO. PuB. DEFENDER COMM'N, supra note 32, at 91, 94.
73. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, supra note
11, at 8.
74. Mo. REV. STAT. § 600.040.1 (2000).
75. STATE OF MO. PuB. DEFENDER COMM'N, supra note 32, at 90.
76. Id. Counties vehemently resist contributing to the economy of other counties
at the expense of their own, and this sort of dispute has given rise to a lawsuit
between counties at least once. Id.
77. Seeid. at 91.
78. Id. at 90.
[Vol. 74
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parking and other facilities, and many counties' flat refusal to do SO. 79 This
attitude of county non-responsibility is also demonstrated by counties' refusal
to pay rent for the MSPD facilities or fund necessary expansions and
improvements to existing facilities, resulting in patently inadequate offices.80
The lack of adequate resources extends far beyond physical structures.
Funding problems also leave indigent defense systems such as the MSPD
without the support services that are essential to clients' adequate
representation, such as research capabilities, basic technology and "the
indispensable assistance of investigators, experts, and administrative staff."8'
For example, in the MSPD's annual report for 2007, the office requested an
additional $5,500 in funding in order to implement an electronic discovery
system that was already available to prosecutors.82 This request was denied
by the legislature. 83 The MSPD also asked for forty-five additional legal
assistants, investigators, and paralegals to aid in administrative matters
thereby allowing the attorneys to dedicate additional time to their more
serious or complex cases.84 This request was also denied, leaving the MSPD
with one investigator for every 1,837 cases, one secretary for every 1,421
cases, one legal assistant for every 3,030 cases, and one paralegal for every
21,592 cases. 85 As the MSPD stated the issue, until the public defender
system in Missouri is drastically reformed, "[j]ustice for all no longer
applies."
86
D. The Separation of Powers Issue
In response to similar problems, other states' indigent defense systems
have attempted various methods of compelling legislative action. Courts,
however, are reluctant to impose direct orders for more funding on their state
79. Id. at 90-91.
80. See id. at 90. Problems include multiple attorneys sharing offices (rendering
"confidential client meeting[s] impossible"), attorneys setting up offices in closets and
eliminating all public space in the office, installing locks on filing cabinets because
they are forced to relocate them to public hallways, eviction notices because counties
refused to pay increases by landlords, and having offices with mud floors, asbestos,
and cockroaches. Id. MSPD contends that these "working conditions undoubtedly
contribute to [high] turnover" rates. Id. MSPD recently filed a complaint with the
Judicial Finance Commission to resolve a dispute over an office which was housed in
a county-owned building with toxic mold. E-mail from Cathy Kelly to author, supra
note 42. MSPD relocated its attorneys, and the county refuses to pay for the alternate
office space. Id.
81. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, supra note
11, at 7.
82. STATE OF MO. PUB. DEFENDER COMM'N, supra note 32, at 95.
83. E-mail from Cathy Kelly to author, supra note 42.
84. STATE OF MO. PuB. DEFENDER COMM'N, supra note 32, at 85.
85. E-mail from Cathy Kelly to author, supra note 42.
86. STATE OF MO. PuB. DEFENDER COMM'N, supra note 32, at 66.
2009]
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legislatures.8 7 This is because in some circumstances, a court's ability to
compel change from its state's legislature has been called into question as a
possible violation of the separation of powers doctrine.88
In the United States, Congress has all legislative powers89 while the
Supreme Court and other federal courts have the judicial power,90 and neither
department is permitted to encroach on the powers of the other. The United
States Constitution does not require states to operate under these same
principles. 91 Even so, it appears that all states function under a similar
separation of powers doctrine in accordance with their own state
constitutional principles.
92
Unlike its federal counterpart, Missouri's state constitution explicitly
adopts a separation of powers doctrine:
The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct
departments-the legislative, executive and judicial-each of
which shall be confided to a separate magistracy, and no person, or
collection of persons, charged with the exercise of powers properly
belonging to one of those departments, shall exercise any power
properly belonging to either of the others, except in the instances in
this constitution expressly directed or permitted. 93
87. For example, the Louisiana Supreme Court defended its refusal to compel its
legislature to fund indigent services by stating, "this Court should not lightly tread in
the affairs of other branches of government." State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 791 (La.
1993).
88. The separation of powers doctrine refers to "[t]he division of governmental
authority into three branches of government - legislative, executive, and judicial -
each with specified duties on which neither of the other branches can encroach; the
constitutional doctrine of checks and balances by which the people are protected
against tyranny." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1396 (8th ed. 2004). This is not
expressly stated in the Constitution, but it is clearly inferred from its division of
enumerated powers among the three distinct branches. Kwai Chiu Yuen v.
Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 406 F.2d 499, 500-01 (9th Cir. 1969).
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
90. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
91. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957) (citing Dreyer v.
Illinois, 187 U.S. 71 (1902)); see also Daniels v. Area Plan Comm'n of Allen County,
306 F.3d 445, 467 (7th Cir. 2002).
92. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 216 (2008); State ex rel. Black v. Burch, 80
N.E.2d 294, 299 (Ind. 1948).
93. Mo. CONST. art. H, § 1.
[Vol. 74
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However, the Supreme Court of Missouri has repeatedly acknowledged that,
"From a pragmatic standpoint it is obvious that some overlap of functions
necessarily must occur."
9
Still, some courts have applied indirect persuasion in order to compel
the legislature to act. For example, in the 1981 Missouri Supreme Court case
State ex rel. Wolffv. Ruddy,95 the court "urge[d] the co-equal Executive and
Legislative branches of government to each assume its share of
responsibility," but declined to directly order the legislature to pay the
attorneys who represented indigent defendants. 96  Instead, the court
acknowledged that its primary duty was to secure the constitutional rights of
indigent defendants, and outlined temporary guidelines that required the
release of any indigent defendant who was denied timely right to counsel.
97
Similarly, other courts prevented the prosecution of indigent defendants until
the legislature remedied the issue of inadequate legal representation through
proper funding. 98  This is usually done by establishing a rebuttable
presumption that each defendant received inadequate assistance of counsel.99
Notably, two courts further extended their use of judicial power to force
the legislature into action. In State v. Smith,100 the Arizona Supreme Court
ordered a county to follow specific guidelines, based largely on the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice. 10 1 The new guidelines required a decrease in
attorney caseloads and an increase in attorneys' fees paid by the county,
although at the time the county had no limit on caseloads and it had a difficult
time acquiring contract attorneys to work for its offered compensation.
102
Still, the court was unsympathetic and stipulated that if the guidelines were
not followed, the court would reverse all appealed convictions obtained under
the deficient system, unless the state could demonstrate that its error was
harmless in each case. 10 3 This essentially "forced legislative action," as the
county quickly adopted the new guidelines despite the high cost.104
94. Goodrum v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 824 S.W.2d 6, 12 (Mo. 1992) (en
banc) (emphasis omitted); State Tax Comm'n v. Admin. Hearing Comm'n, 641
S.W.2d 69, 74 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
95. 617 S.W.2d 64 (Mo. 1981) (en banc).
96. Id. at 66-68.
97. Id. at 67.
98. See, e.g., Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895,
912-13 (Mass. 2004); State v. Citizen, 898 So. 2d 325, 338-39 (La. 2005).
99. See, e.g., State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 791 (La. 1993).
100. 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984).
101. Id. at 1381. The ABA guidelines included setting maximum caseload limits,
considering criteria for determining attorneys' fees in criminal cases, and requiring
adequate investigative and support services for the defense counsel. Id. at 1380,
1382.
102. Id. at 1382.
103. See id. at 1381 ("there will be an inference that the adequacy of
representation is adversely affected by the system"); see also Note, Effectively
Ineffective: The Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent Defense Systems,
20091
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In State v. Lynch, 105 the Oklahoma Supreme Court took a different
approach after declaring some appointed attorneys' compensation to be
unconstitutional. 106  Two court-appointed attorneys spent more than 175
hours working on a first degree murder case in which the state sought the
death penalty, and at the end of the trial the defendant was convicted and
sentenced to life. 10 7 During their work on the case, the attorneys lost a
significant amount of money in overhead expenses and billable services, for
which they requested compensation at a rate well above the maximum
statutory fee of $1,600 each. 08 The court granted the request, as it concluded
that the inadequate compensation offered by the state amounted to an
unconstitutional taking of the attorneys' property.'0 9 While it "invite[d]
legislative attention to [the] problem," the court put guidelines in place for
indigent attorneys' fees that corresponded with the hourly rates of the state's
prosecutors. 10 The court ordered that the guidelines be followed until the
legislature solved the problem itself."1  In response, Oklahoma's state
legislature created an indigent defense system and raised its attorney
compensation caps significantly.' However, neither the Smith nor the Lynch
court was effective in the long-term; both indigent defense systems involved
were again in financial crisis within years of implementing the compelled
guidelines. 113
118 HARv. L. REV. 1731, 1740 (2005) (citing Rodger Citron, Note, (Un)Luckey v.
Miller: The Case for a Structural Injunction to Improve Indigent Defense Services,
101 YALE L.J. 481, 501 (1991)).
104. Note, supra note 103, at 1741 (citing Caroline A. Pilch, State v. Smith:
Placing a Limit on Lawyers' Caseloads, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 759, 767 (1985)).
105. 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990).
106. Id. at 1152-54.
107. Id. at 1153.
108. Id. at 1153-54. The court concluded that had the two attorneys accepted the
statutory fee, one attorney would have lost $41.41 per hour and the other $33.39 per
hour in overhead expenses alone. Id.
109. Id. at 1154, 1163.
110. Id. at 1160-61.
111. Id.
112. Note, supra note 103, at 1739 (citing Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of
Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH
L. REV. 1,9).
113. By 1992, in the county at issue in Smith, funding was "'scarce,"' attorneys
were representing 200 defendants per year instead of the court's standard of 150, and
"'successive recent budget cuts [] threaten[ed] office paralysis and quality
assurance."' Id. at 1741 (quoting Dean Trebesch, New Challenges in Indigent
Defense, Aiz. ATr'Y, Nov. 1992, at 25, 26). Additionally, hiring and promotions
had ceased entirely, and turnover rates and caseloads continued to increase. Id. The
Oklahoma Indigent Defense System that was created in response to Lynch was
"nearly forced to shut down" in 1992, and had since faced "repeated financial crises"
due to lack of enforcement of the guidelines established by the court. Id. at 1739-40.
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III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
More than a decade ago, the American Bar Association (ABA) placed
public defenders in the spotlight by highlighting problems plaguing the
system. n 4 More recently, the ABA also stimulated developments in the
criminal justice community when it issued the opinion, Ethical Obligations of
Lawyers Who Represent Indigent Criminal Defendants When Excessive
Caseloads Interfere with Competent and Diligent Representation." 5 In this
opinion, the ABA commanded that, "[i]f workload prevents a lawyer from
providing competent and diligent representation to existing clients, she must
not accept new clients." 116  The ABA made it clear that this workload-
limiting rule, derived from the Model Rules,"17 applies equally to private
lawyers and to "lawyers who represent indigent persons charged with
crimes. ' l 8 In assessing whether a caseload is excessive, many factors must
be considered, including actual number of cases, the complexity of each case,
the amount of resources available to the lawyer, the lawyer's own
qualifications (including experience and ability), and the lawyer's collateral
duties to his office and clients."
9
According to the ABA opinion, if a public defender believes that his
caseload is excessive, it is his ethical duty to not accept new clients and he
must request the court or his supervisor to refrain from assigning him new
cases.1 20 Further, if the public defender believes that his excessive caseload
prevents him from competently representing current clients, he must also ask
the court or his supervisor for permission to withdraw from a sufficient
number of cases. 121 In the event that permission is denied in either situation,
the public defender must comply with the court's order, but also take all steps
"reasonably feasible" to competently and diligently represent his clients. 122
Professionals in Missouri's legal community agree with the ABA's
assertion that heavy caseloads are endangering indigent defendants' access to
competent legal assistance. For example, in a 2007 address, Laura Denvir
Stith, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Missouri, voiced her concern
over the condition of Missouri's public defender system. 23 She asserted that
114. ABA STANDING CoMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, supra note
11.
115. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441 (2006).
116. Id.
117. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDucT RR. 1.1, 1.2(a), 1.4 (2008).






123. Laura Denvir Stith, Chief Justice Laura Denvir Stith Addresses the Missouri
Bar, Judicial Conference in Springfield, 63 J. Mo. B. 282, 284-85 (2007).
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Missouri must support its failing public defender system in order to ensure
that all Missourians have access to proper legal representation. 124 She further
acknowledged that the MSPD has a "growing problem of providing
constitutionally adequate legal representation" due to its high turnover rates
and soaring caseloads. 25
In the recent Missouri case State ex rel. Wolfrum v. Wiesman, 26 the
Missouri Supreme Court addressed whether two public defenders should have
been granted additional time to prepare for a capital trial when they were
admittedly unprepared due to a heavy caseload and restricted investigatory
resources. 127 The two attorneys were representing indigent clients in a total
of eleven capital cases, and one attorney was also the managing supervisor
over twenty pending first-degree murder cases. 128  Further, the public
defender's office only had "one investigator and two mitigation specialists"
for its entire caseload. 129 The court held that, despite the defendant's demand
to be tried within 180 days pursuant to Missouri Revised Statute § 217.460,
the attorneys showed good cause for additional time and the trial judge should
have granted the attorneys' request.130 Due to the attorneys' inadequate time
and resources, a continuance of the underlying case was required in order to
avoid the possibility of ineffective assistance. In arguing against the grant
of additional time, the state contended that the error of ineffective assistance
could simply be corrected by a later retrial. 132 The court found this argument
to be inappropriate and emphasized, "[a]ny defendant that has exercised his
right to counsel is guaranteed effective assistance of counsel, and courts
should do the utmost to 3protect the defendant's right to adequate and
competent representation."
3
The issue of inadequate indigent defense again gained national attention
in 2007, when an Ohio judge assigned a public defender to try a case only
two and a half hours after appointment, and the public defender - unprepared
and following his office's policy - refused to accept the case for trial.134 As a
result, the judge arrested the public defender for contempt and held him in
custody for five hours, complaining that the delay inconvenienced the state's
witnesses and that "most defendants plead guilty in his court just after
meeting their lawyer anyway."' 35 The public defender was later fined $100
124. Id.
125. Id. at 285.
126. 225 S.W.3d 409 (Mo. 2007) (en banc).
127. Id. at 410.
128. Id. at 410 n.5.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 411-12.
131. Id. at 412.
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
134. Jack King, NACDL News, CHAMPION, Sept.-Oct. 2007, at 8, 10-11.
135. Id. at 11.
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and ordered to pay $50 restitution to compensate two state trial witnesses for
their time away from work.' 36 The president of the National Association of
Criminal Defense Lawyers (NACDL), Carmen Hernandez, expressed disgust
with the judge's actions, stating:
Too often in this country, defense lawyers are pressured to go to
trial or plead clients guilty without having performed the
investigation and research required by the Sixth Amendment and
ethical rules .... Criminal defense lawyers take an oath to uphold
the Constitution and that requires that we provide effective
assistance of counsel. Without a prepared defense lawyer, the
prosecution is not put to its proof and the system fails in its truth-
seeking function. NACDL is committed to supporting lawyers,
like [the public defender in this case], who stand up for their
clients' rights and fight to ensure that the system produces justice,
not just efficiency.
The NACDL also issued a public statement condemning the judge's actions
in hopes of bringing attention to the constitutional rights of indigent
defendants to receive effective assistance of counsel.
138
Heavy public defender caseloads were again at issue in the 2008
Minnesota case of State v. Davis,139 in which the defendant was charged with
a serious crime 14 and was represented by a public defender. 141 At the
defendant's first appearance, his public defender assisted him in obtaining a
trial date, which was set according to the defendant's formal demand for a
speedy trial. 142 However, three days before the scheduled trial date, the
public defender requested a continuance due to a month-long conflict with
another trial. 143 The defendant did not waive his right to a speedy trial. 144
Nonetheless, the trial court granted the continuance and informed the
defendant that because it was his counsel who caused the delay in the trial,
the defendant lost his ability to complain on appeal that he was denied his
right to a speedy trial. 145 On appeal, the defendant asserted that because his
counsel was court-appointed, the state should "bear the responsibility for the
delay caused by public defenders' caseloads," as the state did when
136. Id. at 10-I1.
137. Id. at 11.
138. Id.
139. No. A07-0331, 2008 WL 2020402 (Minn. Ct. App. May 13, 2008).
140. The crime was "fleeing a peace officer in a motor vehicle resulting in death."
Id. at *1.
141. Id. at *2.
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prosecutors' caseloads caused trial delays. 146 The appellate court granted the
defendant no relief, reasoning that the state would not bear this responsibility
because it did not deliberately overburden its public defenders.
147
A recent Kentucky case, Lewis v. Hollenbach,148 foreshadows what
might soon happen in other states. In an attempt to force Kentucky's general
assembly to properly fund the state's public defender system, a group of
public defenders and similarly interested organizations 149 filed a petition for
declaratory judgment against Kentucky state officials.' 50  The petition
claimed that Kentucky's public defender system is in a severely underfunded
condition that is forcing its attorneys to handle an unethical number of
cases, 151 and that the -public defender system will run completely out of
money in mid-2009. Anticipating the inevitable, the public defenders
developed a "service reduction plan" that would reduce their caseload and
work within the system's meager funding limits. 153 In order to implement the
plan, the plaintiffs sought three declarations from the court: that (1)
Kentucky public defenders "may . . . legally decline to accept certain
appointments to represent indigent criminal defendants," (2) indigent
defendants who are declined by public defenders but still subject to
prosecution must be appointed private defense counsel at the state's expense,
and (3) that it is "legal and proper" for Kentucky courts to order the state of
Kentucky to pay for the fees of any such private defense counsel. 54 Other
146. Id. at *3.
147. Id.
148. Lewis v. Hollenbach, No. 08-CI-1094 (Ky. Franklin Cir. Ct. June 30, 2008).
149. The plaintiffs were (1) "Erwin W. Lewis, individually and in his official
capacity as Kentucky's Public Advocate and on behalf of attorneys employed by the
Department of Public Advocacy," (2) "The Department of Public Advocacy," (3)
"Daniel T. Goyette, individually and in his capacity as Chief Public Defender and
Executive Director of Louisville and Jefferson County Public Defender Corporation
and on behalf of attorneys employed by the Louisville and Jefferson County Public
Defender Corporation," (4) "Louisville and Jefferson County Public Defender
Corporation," (5) "Frank Mascagni, III, individually and on behalf of others similarly
situated," and (6) "John Doe individually and on behalf of others similarly situated."
Petition for Declaratory Judgment at 1-2, Lewis v. Hollenbach, No. 08-Cl- 1094 (Ky.
Franklin Cir. Ct. June 30, 2008).
150. See generally id.
151. Id. at 3. This is based on NAC Standard 13.12: Workload of Public
Defenders, issued in a 1973 report of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals. Id. at 14. In 2007, the American Council of Chief
Defenders urged that caseloads should never exceed the NAC standards. Id. at 15.
Petitioners also cited ABA Formal Opinion 06-441. Id; see also ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441, supra note 115.
152. Petition for Declaratory Judgment, supra note 149, at 4.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 4-5.
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state public defender systems with remarkably similar problems - including
Missouri - will surely be interested in the outcome of this case.
In November, 2007, Missouri's Public Defender Commission took a
different approach to reform its public defender system. In an attempt to
address the caseload crisis which is "jeopardizing justice in Missouri[],"' 155
the Commission adopted a procedure that allowed the MSPD Director to
assess when a district office has operated with excessive caseloads156 for at
least three consecutive months and thereafter certify an overburdened office
as "of limited availability."' 5 7  If an office was certified as such, the
appropriate court would receive a notice of at least one month before the
office planned to stop accepting some cases. 158 The District Defender was
then required to consult with the court and the state's attorney to discuss
categories of cases the overburdened office would no longer accept. 159 When
the office actually intended to function on a limited availability status, it was
then required to file with the court a final list of categories of cases it would
no longer accept, and no cases that fell within that category would be
accepted by the office for as long as it retained its limited availability
status.160 Cathy R. Kelly, a Deputy Director of the MSPD, 161 admitted that
this procedure was not what was best for defendants who would be turned
away, but asserted that it was constitutional and it was necessary because,
"[i]f we can't handle every case that walks in the door - and we can't - we
need to take care of those cases with the most serious consequences for the
client."
162
Unfortunately, this limited availability procedure was short-lived. On
April 14, 2009 the Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District declared that
the MSPD could no longer use the procedure to refuse cases, because doing
so directly violated a statutory mandate. 163 The conflicting Missouri statute
explicitly requires the MSPD to provide representation in the types of cases
the limited availability procedure allowed the MSPD to decline. 164 The court
155. Press Release, supra note 65.
156. The standard is maintained by the State Public Defender Commission. Mo.
CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 10-4.010(1)(A) (2008).
157. Id. § 10-4.010(2)(A); see also Press Release, supra note 65.
158. MO. CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 10-4.010(2)(B). The appropriate court is the court
before which that office has cases pending. Id.
159. Id. § 10-4.010(2)(C).
160. Id. § 10-4.010(2)(E). The limited availability status will be removed when
the caseloads at the office have remained under their maximum caseload standard for
at least two months. Id. § 10-4.010(3)(B).
161. Current deputy director, as of March 23, 2009.
162. Press Release, supra note 65.
163. State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm'n v. Hamilton, Nos. WD70327,
WD70349, 2 (Mo. App. W.D. Apr. 14, 2009), available at http://www
.courts.mo.gov/file/OpinionWD70327%20and%20WD70349.pdf; see also Mo. REv.
STAT. § 600.042.4 (Supp. 2008).
164. See Hamilton, Nos. WD70327, WD 70349, at 2.
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declared that the MSPD had exceeded the scope of its statutory authority as a
state agency and further asserted that when a regulation promulgated by an
agency is inconsistent with a statute, "'the regulation must fail."",165 Despite
this ruling, the court did acknowledge "that serious issues exist concerning
the caseloads the public defender system is asked to shoulder and the staffing
and other resources it is afforded to accomplish its important mission," and
commended the MSPD for its "effort to address these serious issues in a
considered, systematic, and responsible way."' 66 It is still possible for the
limited availability procedure to become a valid, legally recognized practice.
Currently, the Missouri General Assembly is considering a bill that would
give the MSPD statutory authority to decline cases. 16 7 If this bill passes, it
would undoubtedly resolve the conflict the court found in this recent case.
Even so, as a result of this ruling, the MSPD is in an even more dismal
situation. According to Deputy Director Cathy Kelly, the MSPD would have
to hire 192 additional public defenders in order to effectively represent all of
its current clients. 68 This seems especially unlikely to occur in light of the
MSPD's current funding crisis. In fact, in December 2008, the MSPD was
forced to implement a department-wide hiring freeze in order to meet its
payroll costs. 169 This freeze further weakened an already severely injured
system. The MSPD requested additional funding necessary to lift the
hiring freeze, but has not yet received a response from the state legislature.1
71
As long as the MSPD is unable to fill vacancies in its district offices, "for
many of Missouri's poor facing criminal charges, the constitutional right to a
lawyer may be on hold."
172
165. Id. at 8, 15.
166. Id. at 14.
167. See Mark Morris, Appeals Court Says Missouri Public Defenders Cannot
Refuse New Cases, KANSAS CITY STAR, Apr. 14, 2009, available at
http://www.kansascity.com/l15/story/1142392.html; see also Michael Bushnell,
Missouri Senator Seeks to Overhaul Public Defender System, COLUMBIA MISSOURIAN
Apr. 15, 2009, available at http://www.columbiamissourian.com/stories/2009
/04/15/mo-senator-seeks-overhaul-public-defender-system/.
168. See Morris, supra note 167.
169. Press Release, Mo. State Public Defender, Missouri's Public Defender
System Announces Hiring Freeze (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.publicdefe
nder.mo.gov/Newsfeed/20081215.htm.
170. Id. "We already don't have enough people to handle the caseload .... We
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IV. DISCUSSION
A. Change Must Happen on a Systemic Level
While the 2006 ABA opinion regarding a workload-limiting rule was
powerful, it stopped short of implementation of the policies it urged. The
opinion demanded that public defenders turn away new defendants when
excessive caseloads rendered competent represention of new clients
impossible. 173 Unfortunately, however, the opinion's useful guidance ends
here, as it speaks only to the responsibility of individual attorneys rather than
addressing reform for the system as a whole. It gives no indication of what
should happen to the cases that are turned away and offers no options for how
to resolve the situation on a systemic level. The ABA's related piece,
Gideon's Broken Promise, is also compelling but it, too, offers the bare
recommendation that attorneys refuse to accept new cases in the face of
excessive workloads. 174 These recommendations should be followed but fall
short of being realistic if defendants have nowhere else to go.
Further, ordering a public defender to represent a client when he cannot
do so competently, as the Ohio judge did, 75 is unethical and will not solve
any of the deeper problems plaguing Missouri's Public Defender System. In
fact, if a public defender's efforts to be ethical can so easily be thwarted by a
judge, and if the push toward appropriate reform is not met with the resources
required for success, public defenders will continue to work in vain for a
revolution that will never happen. In order for true transformation of the
system to occur, all of the players - including judges - must work together in
order to overhaul the entire public defender system. The state of Missouri
needs to clearly redefine its indigent defense mission and lay out the steps
necessary to address the problem on a large scale, involving the judiciary,
legislature, the MSPD, and all attorneys who are members of the Missouri
Bar in its efforts. Within this charge to overhaul the system, the first step
should be to create and implement a plan for allocating reasonable funding.
B. There Must Be Adequate Funding
Since Gideon, Missouri has tried each of the three primary models for
providing statewide indigent defense. 76 The first two - appointed counsel
and contract counsel - were abandoned due to failure, and the current system
is in danger of failing as well. Regardless of the model chosen, success is
173. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof 1 Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-441, supra
note 115, at 1.
174. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, supra note
11, at 43.
175. See King, supra note 134, at 10.
176. See supra Part II.B.
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possible only with adequate funding. The MSPD's "limited availability"
procedure, which utilized some of the strategies recommended by Missouri's
Chief Justice Stith,177 was necessary for the MSPD to survive its current
underfunded condition. 78 Public defenders in "limited availability" offices
were working with prosecutors to waive jail time for some offenses, thereby
eliminating the constitutional requirement of counsel in some cases. 79 Even
it had not been struck down, the procedure was less than ideal because it left
many indigent defendants without counsel. Furthermore, it would not have
solved the current crisis because there still is a large funding shortfall. In
2007, Chief Justice Stith publicly called for increased funding from the
legislature. 80 Without more funding, the MSPD will either have to continue
to juggle more cases than its attorneys can competently manage, or, if the
legislature passes a statute allowing it to do so, severely restrict the cases it
accepts. Both of these options, however, are practices that risk sacrificing the
defense of some indigent criminal defendants in order to save the
constitutional rights of others.
On the other hand, the MSPD's new procedure, even though recently
struck down, might still indirectly lead to more legislative funding. In fact,
reinstatement of this procedure or one that would similarly allow the MSPD
to determine a maximum caseload is a real possibility,' 81 and it is estimated
that all but four or five of the MSPD's district offices could be labeled with
having an excessive caseload, thus qualifying for limited availability status. 182
Because a number of indigent clients would necessarily be turned away by
the MSPD, the implications are obvious. Indigent defendants in most areas of
the state could soon be refused representation by the MSPD, and those who
do not have a constitutionally established right to an attorney' 83 might be
faced with the prospect of trudging through Missouri's criminal court system
177. Stith, supra note 123, at 284-85. The suggestions were (1) establish a court
rule to limit the caseload of public defenders, (2) "reduc[e] the types of cases in which
public defenders are appointed," (3) encourage prosecutors "to eliminate incarceration
as a potential punishment for [some] offenses," and (4) "greatly increas[e] funding
from the legislature." Id. at 285.
178. Press Release, supra note 65.
179. Id. However, there is no requirement for prosecutors to do so.
180. Stith, supra note 123, at 284-85.
181. The bill to essentially enforce by statute the MSPD limited availability
procedure, Senate Bill 37, was approved in the upper chamber of the General
Assembly by a vote of 32-0 in March 2009 and is now being considered by the House
General Laws Committee (as of April 15, 2009). See Bushnell, supra note 167.
182. Kelly Wiese, Missouri Public Defenders Commission Will Refuse to Take
Some New Cases, KANSAS CITY DAILY REC., Oct. 1, 2007, available at
http://fmdarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn418 1/is_2007 100 1/ain21102975?tag=col 1 ;fa
_relatedwidget.
183. Generally, this pertains to offenses that do not have a possibility of jail time,
or the prosecutor waives jail time. This includes most misdemeanors and many non-
violent felonies. Press Release, supra note 65.
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without any legal representation at all. However, as previously discussed,
Gideon, Strickland and a long line of other cases have clearly established a
constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel for indigent defendants
under many circumstances.18 4 Moreover, these cases do not indicate in any
sense that the right simply disappears when state-funded public defenders
refuse to accept indigent clients. In January 2009, Chief Justice Stith
expressed her concern that Missouri's inability to meet constitutional
requirements for indigent defense could ultimately lead to defendants being
set free rather than going to jail, which is "a serious public safety aspect of
the public defender crisis.' 181 As a result, if Missouri judges want to avoid
the dismissal of cases, they will be forced to appoint private counsel to ensure
quality legal representation for defendants who face the possibility of
incarceration. This, in turn, begs the question of exactly how those private
attorneys will be paid.
There was apparently only one minimal compensation safeguard offered
by the MSPD limited availability procedure.' 86 The judge had to inform the
defendant's appointed private counsel (assuming he has been granted private
counsel), that he was entitled to file a request for reimbursement of
reasonable litigation costs with the MSPD, which may approve the request.1
87
If the MSPD did not, or in the more likely event could not, reimburse the
attorney, or reimbursed him only partially, the attorney would not be
satisfied. Missouri's highest court has already declared that it will not force
the state's attorneys to accept the responsibility at their own expense.'
88
Furthermore, counties will not likely volunteer to assist in the effort to pay
these extra costs, as they have already shown distaste for funding the MSPD
district offices.189 Therefore, a cycle of dysfunction is evident. If the MSPD
turns away indigent defendants, judges will appoint private counsel. Private
counsel will not be reimbursed by the state, so judges will then stop
appointing private counsel. Ultimately, the indigent defendants will remain
without counsel.
Successful reform of Missouri's public defender system can only
happen with more funding, and that funding must come from Missouri's
legislature. The ABA candidly agrees with this point, as is clear in its first
recommendation for battling the nation's indigent defense crisis:
184. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 341-45 (1963); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984); see also supra Part B.A.
185. Laura Denvir Stith, Chief Justice of the Missouri Supreme Court, State of the
Judiciary Address (Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.courts.mo.gov/page
.asp?id=28987.
186. Mo. CODE REGS. tit. 18, § 10-4.010(5)(A) (2008).
187. Id.
188. State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, 572-73 (Mo. 1971) (en banc).
189. See supra text accompanying notes 73-80.
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"[lto fulfill the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel, state governments should provide increased funding for
the delivery of indigent defense services ... at a level that ensures
the provision of uniform, quality legal representation. The funding
for indigent defense should be in parity with funding for the
prosecution function, assuming that prosecutors are funded and
supported adequately in all respects."'
The ABA urged implementation of this recommendation. 191 Additionally, as
alluded to by the ABA's above statement, a gross inequality of public
defender resources compared to prosecutorial resources is unacceptable.
Such a scheme only worsens the systemic problem because an adversarial
system cannot properly function when the adversaries are unjustly
mismatched.192 There is no appropriate rationale for providing more funding
and higher salaries to prosecutors in Missouri 193 while denying much-needed
funding to those who defend a citizen's constitutional right to competent
counsel.
C. The Judiciary Should Mandate Adequate Legislative Funding
It is clear that greater funding is necessary, but the ultimate issue is how
to best approach the state legislature's apparent unwillingness to increase
funding to the MSPD. The pending lawsuit in Kentucky seeks to have the
state's judiciary force the legislature to pay for court-appointed counsel for
indigent defendants who are not accepted by its overburdened, under-funded
public defense system;' 94 however, at this point, Missouri has sought no such
judicial action. Yet, Missouri's recent limited availability procedure -
although not permissible at this time - may prompt judges, who would be
forced to appoint private counsel if the procedure was revived, to take action
themselves. In order to implement an effective, long-term solution, the
Supreme Court of Missouri should avoid recommending "guidelines" for fee
structures to be paid by the legislature. This timid strategy has repeatedly
proven ineffective in other states' 95 and in Missouri as well, as evidenced by
196the lack of funding and progress since State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy.' Rather,
the court should work with other legal professionals to determine the amount
of funding necessary and directly order the expenditure of funds by the
190. ABA STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, supra note
11, at 41 (emphasis added).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 13-14.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 65-69.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 148-54 (discussing Lewis v. Hollenbach,
No. 08-CI-1094 (Ky. Franklin Cir. Ct. June 30, 2008)).
195. See supra text accompanying notes 100-04.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97.
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legislature. The court must then establish enforcement mechanisms to ensure
a long-term solution.
If the court takes these steps, it is likely that some will view this as a
judicial intrusion on legislative powers. In fact, Missouri's legislature has
recently demonstrated its fear of judicial interference in funding by
attempting to put a "'jurisdiction-stripping' resolution"'' 97 before the voters as
a proposed constitutional amendment. 98 As proposed, the amendment would
have forbidden state courts from ordering the general assembly to "expend
public funds except as expressly approved by legislation or the vote of the
people."' 99 However, the resolution never made it to Missouri's voters, °0
and Missouri's Constitution remains unchanged.201 Therefore, there currently
is no constitutional barrier preventing the Supreme Court of Missouri from
ordering the legislature to properly fund the MSPD; the court must only abide
by the separation of powers doctrine in its common form, as it is already
expressed in Article II of Missouri's Constitution.
20 2
Notably, even the United States Supreme Court has asserted that the
separation of powers doctrine neither requires nor expects complete
separation of the three branches of government.20 3 Although it is true that
generally the courts are not permitted to interfere with the legislature's
204authority to tax and spend °, there is a recognized exception to this judicial
limitation. That exception states that courts have the power and authority "to
determine and compel payment of those sums of money which are reasonable
and necessary to carry out their mandated responsibilities and their powers
and duties to administer justice. 20 5 This includes adequate funding of court-
197. Missouri Bar Watch, Missouri Bar Spring Meeting, http://www.mobarwatch
.com/report.aspx?id=27 (last visited Mar. 24, 2009).
198. H.R.J. Res.41, 94th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2008).
199. Id.
200. For current status of the resolution, see Missouri House of Representatives,
HJR 41, http://www.house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills081/bills/hjr41.htm.
201. Article 5 of the Missouri Constitution currently states, "The judicial power of
the state shall be vested in a supreme court, a court of appeals consisting of districts as
prescribed by law, and circuit courts." Mo. CONST. art. V, § 1. The amendment
would have been added to this language as sections 2, 3, and 4 of article 5. H.R.J.
Res. 41.
202. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
203. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) ("Yet it is also clear from the
provisions of the Constitution itself, and from the Federalist Papers, that the
Constitution by no means contemplates total separation of each of these three
essential branches of Government."); see also Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394, 406 (1928).
204. See supra Part II.D for discussion of the separation of powers doctrine. See
also Richard M. Frank, The Scorpions' Dance: Judicially Mandated Attorney's Fees
- The Legislative Response and Separations-of-Powers Implications, 1 EMERGING
ISSUES ST. CONST. L. 73, 74-75 (1988).
205, 20 AM. JuR. 2d Courts § 40 (2005); see also Note, supra note 103, at 1742.
2009]
23
Guyer: Guyer: Saving Missouri's Public Defender System
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2009
MISSOURI LAWREVIEW
appointed attorneys as well as the state's public defender system. In a 1985
child abandonment proceeding, the Supreme Court of Louisiana, citing to
courts from several states,206 asserted this power:
The court's power to furnish counsel for indigents necessarily
includes the power, when reasonably necessary for effective
representation, to issue an order requiring the state, its appropriate
subdivision, department, or agency, to provide for the payment of
207
counsel fees and necessary expenses.
The Louisiana court further insisted that, "[the legislature's] acts or failure to
act cannot destroy, frustrate, or impede the court's inherent constitutional
authority."
20 8
Some courts have gone as far as claiming a judicial duty to compel the
legislature to adequately fund its indigent defense program. The court in
Lynch did so and stated:
[b]ecause of our constitutional responsibilities relating to the
managerial and superintending control of the district courts and of
the practice of law; because of the inherent power of this court to
define and regulate the practice of law; and because of the public
nature, and the certainty of reoccurrence of the problem presented.
209
The Massachusetts Supreme Court, in a strikingly similar situation,
emphasized that it is its duty, as the state's highest court, "to remedy an
ongoing violation of a fundamental constitutional right to counsel., 21 0 Justice
demands - and it is the court's duty to ensure - that indigent defendants
receive effective counsel, and reasonable funding is critical to providing
defendants with this constitutional right.
The Supreme Court of Missouri long ago established that it is the
constitutional duty of the state legislature to provide funding for adequate
indigent defense counsel. 1 Furthermore, the Missouri Constitution grantsthe Missouri Supreme Court "general superintending control over all" lower
206. M. v. S., 404 A.2d 653 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1979); Luke v. L.A.
County, 74 Cal. Rptr. 771 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969); Knox County Council v. State ex rel.
McCormick, 29 N.E.2d 405 (Ind. 1940); Smith v. State, 394 A.2d 834 (N.H. 1978);
State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441 (N.J. 1966); State v. Campbell, 324 So. 2d 395 (La.
1975).
207. In re Johnson, 475 So. 2d 340, 342 (La. 1985).
208. Id. (emphasis added).
209. State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1163 (Okla. 1990).
210. Lavallee v. Justices in Hampden Superior Court, 812 N.E.2d 895, 911 (Mass.
2004).
211. State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Mo. 1971) (en banc).
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212
courts. This type of supervisory power has been asserted by the Louisiana
Supreme Court - in its continuing battle to bring its own indigent defense
system out of crisis - as granting "inherent powers 'to do all things
reasonably necessary for the exercise of its functions' . . . includ[ing] the
authority 'to fashion a remedy which will promote the orderly and
expeditious administration of justice. ' ' 213 Furthermore, the Supreme Court of
Missouri has asserted that "some overlap of functions necessarily must
occur. ' 21 4 Overlap between the judicial and legislative branches is inherent
with regard to the state's indigent defense system, a system which must
function within Missouri's courts but cannot function without legislative
funding. Therefore, Missouri's highest court can and should order the state's




Ideally, the legislature would go beyond mere constitutional
requirements for funding in order to truly repair the state's public defender
system. A significant increase in funding would allow for positive reform of
a broken system. Even if the MSPD's limited availability procedure for
controlling its caseload is reinstated by statute - and especially if it is not - its
attorneys will continue to work for substandard salaries with second-rate
216facilities and a serious lack of support services. These factors contribute to
the deprivation of adequate representation as well as attorney burnout and a
217high turnover rate. If the MSPD were able to secure adequate funding, it
should then hire the number of attorneys necessary to ethically represent the
218full extent of cases involving indigent defendants. It should also hire
212. Mo. CONST. art. V, § 4.
213. State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 790-91 (La. 1993) (quoting Konrad v.
Jefferson Parish Council, 520 So. 2d 393, 397 (La. 1988); State v. Mims, 329 So. 2d
686, 688 (La. 1976)).
214. Goodrum v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 824 S.W.2d 6, 12 (Mo. 1992) (en
banc) (emphasis omitted); State Tax Comm'n v. Admin. Hearing Comm'n, 641
S.W.2d 69, 74 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
215. Note, supra note 103, at 1742.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 59-86.
217. Stith, supra note 123, at 284-85.
218. During the fiscal year 2006, the 292 public defenders in MSPD's trial
division opened 86,368 new cases, translating to an average annual caseload per
public defender of about 296. STATE OF MO. PuB. DEFENDER COMM'N, supra note 32,
at 8. MSPD has concluded that its blended caseload of misdemeanors and felonies
translates to a standard recommended by the Department of Justice's National
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards (NAC) of 225 cases per attorney
per year. Id. Therefore, for MSPD to meet NAC's standard, it would need to employ
384 attorneys (86,368 total cases divided by 225 cases per attorney). MSPD would
need to hire approximately 92 more full-time attorneys.
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additional support staff for its offices and fund investigative resources that are
comparable to those of Missouri's prosecutors.
These measures would drastically reduce the amount of undue stress that
currently plagues Missouri's public defenders, which would likely decrease
the high turnover rate. If the MSPD is able to retain its attorneys for longer
periods of time and provide them with necessary resources, it could become
armed with a staff of highly skilled advocates who are extensively competent
and experienced in criminal defense litigation. This would bring greater
integrity and dignity to Missouri's public defenders and the system they
advocate under, thereby legitimizing the indigent defendant's constitutional
right to effective assistance of counsel.
Missouri's public defender system is being crushed by the weight of
excessive caseloads, and adequate funding from Missouri's state legislature is
vital to its recovery. Although this daunting issue has been publicly
acknowledged by prominent legal figures, key legislators, and the Office of
the Missouri State Public Defender itself, the legislature as a whole has failed
to grant the system the funding it requires to function successfully. The
Office of the Missouri State Public Defender has attempted to take on the
crisis on its own with its recent failed attempt to operate under a "limited
availability" status, which might have alleviated some of the problems
currently caused by unethically high caseloads. However, even
implementation of this procedure would have left the MSPD with an
enormous dilemma. It is clear that without a systemic approach, the support
of the judiciary, and a substantial increase in funding from Missouri's state
legislature, the problem will not be solved. Because the legislature has thus
far been unwilling to adequately fund Missouri's public defender system, the
judiciary should use its authority to compel the legislature to do so. Without
judicial intervention, the system is likely to collapse and every indigent
Missourian will be in jeopardy of proceeding through the criminal justice
system without constitutionally required effective legal counsel.
JUSTINE FINNEY GUYER*
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